How Different Are Hobbes and Locke?

Thomas Hobbes famously argued that man’s natural state is war. Man is at war because he seeks to protect himself and his interests, which conflict with other men’s. Hobbes breaks it down into three categories: Man is at war because of “competition, diffidence, and glory” [Hobbes 76]. In other words, man is at war because he desires the same things as other men, he fears other men, and he wants other men to fear him. Hobbes claims that the only thing that can end the state of war is “assurance to the contrary” [Hobbes 76]. In other words, an assurance of peace is the only thing that will keep men from being at war with one another.

John Locke pushes back on Hobbes’ argument that war is the natural state of things. He argues that men originally live in peace with one another. Their reason impels them to respect one another's property, which becomes theirs as a result of appropriation through labor. When one man usurps what rightfully belongs to another, he breaks this natural order. Then, the victim has a right to defend himself and/or seek retribution. 

Locke makes the point that it is hard for man to remove his passions from administering justice. Thus, the retribution, without a formalized social compact, is unlikely to be proportional to the preceding injustice. Locke concedes that this will lead to a perpetual cycle of injury and retribution as “...it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for where-ever violence is used and injury done, though by hands used to administer justice, it is still violence and injury” [Locke 16]. 

Since Hobbes establishes that war is the natural state of things, is Locke really adding anything relevant by claiming that the natural state of things leads to war? Both scenarios end up with war, which man needs to address via a social compact. I will concede that his property argument is certainly innovative, but I ask: Do the fruits of man’s labor belong to him if he cannot defend them?

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Development as White Saviorism

Sen’s take on viewing development as freedom seems coherent when the developing body is a part of the community that is being developed. There are troublesome aspects (like the implicit acceptance of unequal distribution of freedoms), but those can be justified and or fixed with minor alterations. However, the account’s flaws become prominent when applied to situations where the developing body is external to the community that is being developed. Because Sen does not factor in the context of when the development occurs and does not outline who can even be a developer, his account would allow for white saviorism.  The issue is not with what Sen’s account includes, but what it does not. Sen’s account does not argue for an equal distribution of freedom. While he believes we should expand freedoms in the most effective way, if this does not expand freedoms equally, it is not clear that Sen would view that as a bad thing. This leaves room for marginalized people in society to be even mor
Read more

I used to be a libertarian and i think Nozick is full of shit

In Anarchy State and Utopia, Nozick argues that patterned principles of justice will require “continuous interference with people’s lives” to continually realize their pattern of distributive justice (162). As an alternative, he argues for an unpatterned principle of distributive justice (PDJ) based on the principle of entitlement. I want to examine some of the key assumptions and concepts he makes in his account in this blog post.  Nozick’s entitlement theory views just modes of interacting with one’s holdings as necessarily leading to a just pattern of distribution. Namely, once justice in acquisition and justice in transfer have been achieved, the resulting distribution is just. As Nozick puts is “whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just” (151). He also touches on “the rectification of injustice in holdings” but goes on to say that the exact nature of that principle is unclear and not discussed by him or others (152). This seems like a bit of a dodge to me.
Read more

The other face of the father of capitalism?

I found reading Smith's theory of Moral Sentiments interesting because a lot of it felt nothing like what he's purported to be according to all the "father of capitalism" stuff. I see how he developed something like the invisible hand because of how he develops his theory: based on observation. He makes empirical claims above human behavior in relation to which actions we approve and disapprove based on how much we can sympathize with the actor. Both this theory and the one about the invisible hand seems to be an explanation about an observed phenomena.  While I think that the method he uses to develop his theories are similar, the ideas present in this piece seems radically different than ideas on capitalism. The ideas that he present in Chapter two remind me a lot of Kantian ethics. The specific passage that reminded me of this was:  "When he views himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he sees that to them he is but one of the
Read more