Is there always a force that constraints us?

Interestingly both Locke and Hobbes point out to forces that restrain our actions in the state of nature, but their reasoning is widely different. Hobbes believes that your self-interest is the most important and thus an individual won’t engage in activities that will not contribute to their preservation. Therefore, we are constrained by ourselves and will not be able to engage in an act that might bring us different emotions, which could enrich our lives, but would not contribute to our self-interest.  

Whereas Locke sees that we are constrained by the “liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession” (Section 6, Chp 2). An individual cannot conduct any action that will inflict harm on another person’s “life, health, liberty, or possessions” (Section 6, Chp 2). This argument is the opposite of what Hobbes is saying as in his understanding everything can be done if it preserves self-interest even when it involves inflicting harm on another person possession. Whereas Locke sets clear boundaries of what is expected of a man in the state of nature.

 

I think there is another constrain that both philosophers would agree on and that is God. Both refer to and mention God in their works; therefore, an individual in both different states of nature would have another force that would constrain their actions. 

 

These different ways of limiting what we should and should not do lead me to think if there could be a state of nature where nothing is guiding us - not even ourselves. While I wanted to provide a historical example for that, I think that looking into the future might be more realistic. Could there be again a state of nature when all Western models of democracy fall, and anarchy sets in? Will, we then follow the route of Locke or Hobbes or just all our values and beliefs will evaporate in the world of technology, and we will be constantly unconsciously motivated to do certain actions because of it. Will technology become modern-day governments? 



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