Justification through Locke

     With Locke fresh in the mind, I noticed contradictions in its interpretation by the founders in Harris's example the colonizers' treatment of Native American land. Through force, Indian traditions were replaced with those of the colonizers. They found this as a legitimate action because conquest itself promoted legitimacy. Furthermore, Harris explains how they heavily relied on Lockean labor theory because it "confirmed and ratified their experience"(Harris 1728). The law's interpretation of these encounters as legitimate is what Harris sees as ultimately leading to whiteness as property. 

    I saw Locke's theories of labor and possibly a degree of picking and choosing by the founders in order to ratify their experience. Certainly, the argument that this land was not "being used" by the Native Americans, at least not in a sense that the Europeans would see, would be backed by Lockean labor theory. If there was land not being used/attributed to an individual, it could be appropriated by someone who would use it. However, it would be difficult justify these actions given Locke's account of legitimate government. Given the lack of universality of Locke's theories, is it really fair to just appropriate lands because another society has different theories/practices. Even if we assume we can, what then? The Native Americans did not willfully enter into a contract with the conquerors to allow their land to be used. Can they be forced to consent. As we have discussed, Lockes fundamental assumption of natural equality seems necessary for his theories to hold, but what about here were the colonizers were technically far more advanced and capable of essentially doing as they please. 

    If the Native Americans felt their natural rights had been violated, Locke would likely say they now had a right to punish the violators, but what if they are physically unable to do so? Does the enforcement of natural law just fall apart? Furthermore, if whiteness is a form of property, it seems logical that Locke would see government forming to protect this property, but why would those do not have this property consent to live in a society where they begin with less property? Assuming they would not, it stands to reason that this would not be a legitimate government according to Locke.

    


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