Locke's Argument on Money and Consent

  While reading Locke’s Second Treatise, I was interested in his discussion about money in Chapter V, On Property. He argues that humans consented to the use of money “thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life” (Locke 46). Locke states that “everyone has a right to as much as he can use, and property in all that he can effect with labor” (Locke 46). When a person makes too much, they don’t want their goods to perish, and thus they seek out ways to maintain this value with non-perishable items (money). With money, people, through agreement, put value on these nonperishable items that are actually less useful than perishable items. Further, this introduction of money and its value lead people to be inclined to enlarge their possessions, past their natural rights. Thus, people have tactically consented to money which leads to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth. 
    Essentially, money has led to major inequalities in our societies. We have all, under Locke’s argument, consented to this way of life, and thus the possibility of being on the worse side of this inequality (poverty). However, it is not true that people born into societies that use money as a means of exchange and value, consent to money.  As Smith points out, one does not consciously consent to these terms, instead, they are born into societies with rules like the use of money as a means of exchange. If one is born into a life of poverty, since their ancestors agreed to the use of money, how is it true to say they have consented to the use of money?
    Smith states, “[h]e will tell you that it is right to do so, that he sees others do it, that he would be punished if he refused to do it.” (Smith 403). Since we were not alive during this transition to using money as a means of exchange, it is not true to say that we voluntarily consent to money. There are many reasons that we use money, but this reasoning is not founded on our consent. Further, in today’s society, people born into abject poverty are considered to consent to this way of life, since they use money which leads to disproportionate outcomes. First off, living in abject poverty may be worse than living in a state of nature, where you must work for someone, and struggle to receive the necessities of life. So, someone, with reason, may not consent to this way of life to improve self-preservation, because deep poverty may be worse than humans' natural way of living. However, it is almost impossible for someone born into poverty to choose and have the ability to live in a human's natural state. Thus, it is not true that people consent to the use of money, and the negative effects that stem from it.

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