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 In the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States equality is invoked as a normative, moral standing that all people have in virtue of being people: "All Men are Created Equal," i.e. they have equal rights claims against each other and equal liberty from interference with their independence.  Locke appeals to the same normative notion of equality.  For Hobbes equality is, by contrast, an empirical condition: "Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that...when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable." [74]  

There is an interesting question as to whether this is true -- are we in fact more or less equal in abilities?  What would Hobbes say about those people, e.g. seriously mentally disabled people, who are not more or less equal in ability?  Does his argument not apply to them?

But the more interesting point is that Hobbes believes that the only equality that people have by nature is equal abilities.  There is no equal moral standing that we enjoy by natural law.  In fact, Hobbes maintains "that nothing can be unjust" in the state of nature, and that the is no right to property, no "mine and thine." [78]  People can have things in the state of nature (possession), they just can't have a right to anything in the state of nature (property).  The remarkable suggestion here for Hobbes is that we create normative, moral equality by agreeing to enter a commonwealth; it is not the basis for legitimate entry into commonwealths.

This raises an interesting question.  Since for Hobbes we only enter into agreement with our fellow citizens, are any claims of justice limited to our fellow citizens?  In short, is Hobbes committed to the view that we can do anything to people outside of our own country, e.g. commit genocide, without doing anything wrong? 

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