continuing the discussion of human's intrinsic value

 Nozick spends time discussing Amartya Sen's argument regarding individual rights. Sen proposes that individual rights are interpreted as the right to choose between two alternatives. If we add the condition that if some alternative is unanimously agreed upon then it is "ranked higher in the social ordering" (164-5). The important comparison that I want to focus on is the implications of Nozick's rejections. Nozick argues that this understanding of individual rights as linear is contradictory. Say two people make a choice between two sets of alternatives. Nozick points out that this could feasibly lead to a social (or aggregate) order leads to A>C even though one person individually picked C>A. Essentially, this arises because one person likes A more than C more than the other likes C>A. 

    So, I see the aggregate or social welfare being "maximized" in Sen's argument and am struck by a very utilitarian sounding argument. I do not know Sen's full argument, but I do not necessarily see the logic above itself as contradictory. The individual's choice certainly conflicts with the social/societal choice, but the logic remains clear as a clear social ordering emerges. Rawls would quickly say to this that the social ordering could not be just if it violates the inalienable rights of humans, but Nozick does use this approach. 

    Nozick poses the idea of "co-possible" individual rights. It accomplishes a similar goal to Rawls by arguing the exercise of these rights "fixes some features of the world" (166). In whatever manner this fixes the world, the boundaries in which social choices can be made are created. However, I note that this does not appear to require an intrinsic value on human life. It seems to me to still appeal to a notion of maximum, simply acknowledging the constraint that people making choices creates. 

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