I used to be a libertarian and i think Nozick is full of shit

In Anarchy State and Utopia, Nozick argues that patterned principles of justice will require “continuous interference with people’s lives” to continually realize their pattern of distributive justice (162). As an alternative, he argues for an unpatterned principle of distributive justice (PDJ) based on the principle of entitlement. I want to examine some of the key assumptions and concepts he makes in his account in this blog post. 

Nozick’s entitlement theory views just modes of interacting with one’s holdings as necessarily leading to a just pattern of distribution. Namely, once justice in acquisition and justice in transfer have been achieved, the resulting distribution is just. As Nozick puts is “whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just” (151). He also touches on “the rectification of injustice in holdings” but goes on to say that the exact nature of that principle is unclear and not discussed by him or others (152). This seems like a bit of a dodge to me. The sheer magnitude of unjust transactions, laws, and private actions seems to suggest that this should be a major point of discussion for a theory of entitlement. Additionally, it seems to greatly confound the practical application of Nozick’s two principles of just distribution. If it’s difficult to separate out the unjust history/ancestry of transactions, how many seemingly just transfers of holdings are ultimately founded on violations of the two principles? The particular pattern of distribution that a society has also seems to be heavily influenced by historical and social factors governing the conception, protection, and definition of property. Nozick seems to view there existing a ‘naturalness’ to the creation and transferring of holdings—that is, he seems to presuppose a particular kind and conception of property, private property. If property is a significantly social creation, then the very concept of holdings and entitlement to those holdings will seem to vary by society—and thus the theory of entitlement will shift from society to society. Nozick’s conception of entitlement seems unable to conceive of communal property. If a society wanted to set aside natural parks or viewed ocean lands as fundamentally sacred and unownable, Nozick’s model seems to prevent that ‘setting aside’ without the consent of every single person who might have a claim to it. Conversely, this ‘setting aside’ might only be possible if someone first owned those particular lands and then unilaterally decided to preserve them. 

This theory of entitlement also views redistributive efforts as the “violation of people’s rights” (168).  After all, if allowing free interaction results in a just distribution then any disruption to that distribution will need to be strongly justified. Indeed, any interference, not simply redistribution, is a seriously violation of individual rights in Nozick’s review. His theory seems to readily allow for the possibility of, and potentially even demand, private (not simply individual) discrimination. By ‘private’, I mean that Nozick’s view seems to also condone discrimination by corporations and other private entitles—not simply discrimination by individuals holding prejudiced views. Since it is likely that Nozick would regard voluntarily created associations of people as just, it seems likely he would also consider the transactions and transfers they entered as equally just. Thus, if a business or business owner decided to refuse service to particular group of people (Black, LGBTQ+, Muslim customers etc.), they would be fully within their rights to do so, since they must have the freedom to choose and not to choose to enter into transactions. 

Perhaps, Nozick could respond that discriminatory business owners will lose out to those who are open to all and thus will suffer for their discrimination—not as a result of a conscious push for inclusion but by the aggregate decisions of free individuals. However, say you lived in a region where a vast majority of people held discriminatory beliefs, carried those out in practice, and ‘corrected’ noncompliance of those beliefs. You would find yourself unable to access any goods or services. Yet, Nozick would claim that this pattern of distribution is just since it result from the free, voluntary actions of individuals and groups using their holdings well within their rights. Thus, it seems as though injustice might occur in a given pattern of distribution even if that pattern is just according to the two principles Nozick sets forth. It seems awfully conceivable that a just distribution on Nozick’s entitlement basis could still have some kind of aggregate effect that is manifestly unjust. In other words, it is necessary for a just distribution to abide by the two principles but not necessarily sufficient. 

Redistribution as being equivalent to forced labor seems to be a tenuous connection. Indeed, it also seems plausible that under the unpatterned principle of distributive justice that Nozick sets forth. If someone must constantly work multiple, grinding jobs to meet their basic material needs, are they not to some extent subject to the will of their employers? If the labor market in their area, through purely voluntary transactions, happens to tend towards a monopoly or (probably more plausibly) an oligopoly would that not be a just scenario for Nozick? This oligopoly could depress wages and increase its profits even with no change in the nature or quality of its production. Would the reduction in wages and increase in profits not constitute a kind of extraction of labor? Is this interaction really supposed to be just or unforced simply because the employee receives a check in compensation (whose amount is determined by the employer)? If redistribution (and all patterned principles) qualifies as “appropriating the actions of other persons”, does extracting surplus labor value count too (172)? Moreover, if the conditions of oligopoly are widespread, does this suggest that the minimal state society Nozick envisions is fundamentally in tension with his unpatterned principle of distributive justice?