Bill Nye is not a science guy

 Johnson’s paper was really interesting to me. I felt like her thoughts about objectively had really interesting implications for both science and statutory interpretation.

Johnson’s argument essentially implied that science was subjective due to the way scientific inquiry requires some kind of ethical consideration. Her description of the problem of inductive risk and demarcation suggested that certain ethical values play a role in deciding what canons of scientific interpretation are deployed in the scientific inquiry which means that canons of interpretation play a role in scientific inquiry. As a result, this means that science is subjective, but obviously this conclusion is quite problematic.

Her argument can also be applied to textualism, a method of statutory construction. Textualism uses canons of interpretation to interpret the text. These canons of statutory interpretation define the relevant considerations in the law and any surrounding statutory text that ought to be taken into account. When we are textualists we use canons of statutory interpretation, but that does not mean we are not objective or not trying to give the best interpretation of the text. The best interpretation of the text requires using the best canon of construction to do that, which means we have to bring in ethical values in textualism. These, however, are set values that are articulated by justices to explain how we interpret the law. Just because we use those canons of construction does not mean we are not textualists.

We cannot have science or law with just the facts or just the text, because the facts and the texts are not self-interpreting. Also, if you say you use just the facts or just the text, you are not being a good scientist or a good judge because both should be able to articulate their canons of interpretation in their processes.

If Johnson’s argument is correct, it does not mean there is no objectivity. It means we have to think a lot more carefully about what we mean when we make claims about objectivity. We need canons to interpret statutory text and scientific facts to get substantive results and create effective and implementable statutes and theories (in both the law and science). If we want to define these processes as objective, we have to redefine/rethink our claims regarding objectivity. 

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