Marx's empiricism and induction

Professor Johnson’s paper advances a convincing account that algorithms, like theories of science, are not value-free. Rather, they are value laden, that is shaped by decisions and choices about a particular set of values. The paper lays out the concept of objectivity as defined by “Dragnet objectivity,” or the ability to separate the facts from any interference in the forms of human values (Johnson, 4-5). The paper then shows how the arguments from demarcation and inductive risk preclude the possibility of Dragnet objectivity within an inductive framework. The method of scientific inquiry and machine learning algorithms are both predicated on the use of an inductive process to generalize conclusions from a set of data. 

Johnson argues that the use of the inductive method relies upon sets of “canons” which are a set of “non-evidential” assumptions that define the parameters of the method of inquiry. These canons help overcome Hume’s problem of induction, and lead to further conclusions. More broadly, Kuhn argues that any form of science relies upon creating a paradigm that both shapes the nature of the questions as well as the tools by which people can answer those questions— “in learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture” (Kuhn, 109). 

Given the view of scientific inquiry painted by Professor Johnson’s and Kuhn’s accounts, I am interested in examining Marx’s arguments in the German Ideology considering his claims as to the empirical nature of his argument. First, I want to explore what is meant by ‘empirical’ both in the framework of a method of scientific inquiry—and how it might fit with Marx’s classification of his account of human history as empirical. 

A scientific theory or fact might be verifiable on an empirical basis if we can observe the actual mechanism or effect occurring. For example, a ball falling in the Earth’s gravitation field is empirical evidence in support of the existence of that field. However, the hypothesis that such a gravitational field even exists was developed through an inductive method of hypothesis generating and then confirmed through the collection of empirical evidence that supported this. This inductive process of hypothesis generating is especially necessary if the internal mechanisms of the process being described are not readily, tangibly, or explicitly observable. That is, describing processes with opaque internal mechanisms necessitates an increased reliance on inductive reasoning. 

The social sciences, by the very nature of their field of inquiry, deal with highly complex processes and interactions determined by the opaque mechanisms like social relations, structures, and pressures. Thus, hypotheses about human behavior rely on a heavy use on the inductive process. Even when these hypotheses render a prediction that seems to comport with empirical reality, they are still subject to the constraints faced by the use of inductive reasoning. Namely, this analysis of human history and material conditions is also subject criticism about demarcation and inductive risk. Indeed, the inductive risk of conclusions about human material conditions is likely far higher than arcane disputes about the nature of subatomic particle interaction. 

What does this all mean? It means that the ‘empirical’ argument Marx lays out is shaped by an investigative method defined by deviance from a value-free ideal. Indeed, Johnson’s paper points to Rudner’s argument that, “ethical values have a legitimate and necessary role to play in guiding scientific inference” (Johnson, 12). Thus, we should view the process by which we evaluate, and Marx creates his arguments, from within the context of a value-laden inductive process. 

I am unsure as to how a value-laden process shaping Marx’s empirical theory of history and economics affects his concept of ideology and his internal critique of competing systems. Perhaps, here Professor Johnson’s paper bears less applicability than Kuhn’s does. I am also interested in understanding to what extent the conceptions of science and scientific inquiry extend into the domain of the social sciences. Importantly, the nature of Kuhn’s conception of circularly reinforcing scientific “paradigms” seems to correspond strongly to the Marxian conception of ideology as a set of ideas that constrains the pool of available information in such a way as to guide and shape further investigation. 



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