Refining Liberalism on Rawls 29 - Zac

 A question on my mind this week, especially emerging out of tutorial and some independent discussions with my peers is how Rawls could develop an account of liberalism that severs from the veil of ignorance and original position, such that it can avoid and potentially incorporate elements of a Marxist critique.

Perhaps the most promising section where Rawls builds this account is when he offers other main arguments for the two principles of justice in 29. 

A first element of note is Rawl's assertion that agreements are only valid if promises are upheld " I shall rely upon the fact that for an agreement to be valid, the parties must be able to honor it under all relevant and foreseeable circumstances." pg. 153. Presumably this means the US and other exams of liberalism are invalid for failing to honor their agreements.

From this Rawls argues "They cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences they cannot accept. They will avoid those that they can adhere to only with great difficulty." pg. 153 This seems like a bit of a leap for me. I don't understand why the liberal state cannot or would not desire to enter into agreements that could simply abandon as invalid. I'm not sure why the burden of commitment is as large as Rawl's asserts, especially when he gives an account of invalid agreements, which appear to have no consequences.

From this Rawl's argues his conception of justice is better suited to how human nature operates, that people need not make commitments they cannot keep "They run no chance of having to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of their life for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others, an undertaking that in actual circumstances they might not be able to keep. Indeed, we might wonder whether such an agreement can be made in good faith at all. Compacts of this sort exceed the capacity of human nature." pg. 54 I'm unsure whether this is a true or justified understanding of human nature, and still why declaring commitments invalid rather then completing them is so bad for the abandoner. Interestingly this seems somewhat to be Marx's logic with liberalism although through materialism moreso then human nature - that it appears impossible for a liberalism agreement to be made in good faith, as the bourgeois willingly giving up power would exceed their class consciousness/cultural-historical nature.

Rawls then uses the ability to avoid the strains of commitment as a strength of his two principles of justice, but given the strains of commitment's overall problems with its justification explained above, I'm not sure if it lends much strength.

Rawls continues with publicity as justification in a way that seems too familiar to the publicity argument we heavily discussed in tutorial "When the basic structure of society is publicly known to satisfy its principles for an extended period of time, those subject to these arrangements tend to develop a desire to act in accordance with these principles and to do their part in institutions which exemplify them. A conception of justice is stable when the public recognition of its realization by the social system tends to bring about the corresponding sense of justice." pg. 155 To me, this justification appears circular and not justified. Simply because something is accepted may mean its likely to continue to be accepted, but it does not appear to provide a reason for it to be accepted, Moreover Rawl's account appears applicable to any structure of society that was once dominant or popular, making both the values of justice vacuous in their application and not binding or compelling any given action of government system.

There is more to discuss in this chapter, but a fully analysis/break down is beyond the scope of the blog post. I will say I was disappointed that even in this chapter he continues to rely on the original position somewhat, and overall still appears to be taking way too many things as implicit or for granted, although less so in section 29 then as discussed in tutorial. I'm still unsure what an independently justified Rawl's liberalism that can incorporate Marx looks like, and I'm hoping seminar is illustrative.


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