(Self) Respect

I wanted to explore Rawls’ discussion of the concept of ‘self-respect’ and how it relates to his principles of justice and potentially interfaces with Marx’s concept of alienation. The concept of self-respect seems to be central to Rawls’ account, and an important connection between one’s pursuit and conception of the good and how those manifest in interactions with other individuals equally committed to (and in Rawls’ view entitled to) pursuing their conception of the good. 

Rawls posits that people having “a sense of their own worth is necessary if they are to pursue their conception of the good with satisfaction and to take pleasure in its fulfillment” (155). That is, a precondition to even pursuing one’s own conception of the good is to have a certain degree of self-respect. What does Rawls mean by ‘self-respect’? Here, his concept of self-respect means more than a vapid self-help poster. He defines it as “not so much a part of any rational plan of life as the sense that one’s plan is worth carrying out” (155). Possessing this sense of worthiness depends on the respect we receive from others. Indeed, Rawls flatly states, “it is clearly rational for men to secure their self-respect” (156). 

Rawls sees self-respect as leading to respect of others and thus an important precondition for a well-ordered society. If, we live in a value-pluralistic society, where people hold vastly different conceptions of the good, self-respect (and respect more generally) seem to be fundamentally important conditions for a stable, just society. Now, how might we ensure that our society reflects these principles of self and mutual respect? To Rawls, his principles of justice convey and establish this respect. By explicating setting out to establish the equal worth of liberties for others and consciously eschewing unjustified inequality “persons express their respect for one another in the very constitution of their society” (156). I thought this was a very interesting way to ground an account of justice. Implicitly, to fully respect others, we must respect them as equals and therefore respect their equal claims to pursue and set their own ends subject to a recognition of the equal standing of others. In this way, inequality and unfreedom are disrespectful to people in the most fundamental way—by withholding a respect for the equality and equal liberty to which they are entitled to. 

Rawls says, “the principles of justice manifest in the basic structure of society men’s desire to treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselves” (156). This intentionally Kantian-sounding formulation seems to emphasize the fundamental nature of self-respect to Rawls’ theory of justice. Respect means treating other individuals as ends in themselves, and not as means. In the context of the social contract, to fully respect others as ends in themselves “implies at the very least treating them in accordance with the principles to which they would consent in an original position of equality” (157). This is a key connection to Rawls’ defense of the original position. Since, in the original position, people exist as perfectly equal, moral persons who will design principles to protect their own claims to pursue their own ends—even if they might not know what those will be. I am a bit more skeptical about his claim here. I am not entirely sure that treating people as ends in themselves would necessarily entail treating them in accordance with what they would agree to in the original position. Could we not simply see what ends and principles they would consent to outside of the original position? If we are devoid from all knowledge that would allow us to develop any specific ends, what ends are there to respect in the original position? I am a bit hesitant that by respecting the mere concept of an end (whose specifics a person outside the original position will define) is equivalent to respecting the actual set of ends that people have. Yet, at the same time, the concept of respect offers a compelling reason to select the conception of justice Rawls advances. If we are to truly respect one another, we must set forth and abide by a scheme of equal basic liberties and inequalities arranged to benefit the least well-off. In this way, people will have the actual ability to pursue and set their own ends but will also actively recognize the rights of others to pursue their own ends as well. In this way, we can avoid disrespecting others by treating them as mere utilitarian ends while also creating the conditions in which their pursuits of their own good can flourish. Since we cannot prevent people from pursuing their own ends, nor easily change their minds, treating them with the respect to which free and equal moral people are entitled to seems a compelling answer.