The Scope of Civil Disobedience… is it enough?

 Rawls focuses on Civil Disobedience and defines it as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of government” (320).  Further it is where “one addresses the sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares that in one's considered opinion the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men are not being respected” (320). These principles of social cooperation are the two principles of justice. The first principle of justice states that there is an equal right to every basic liberty “compatible with a similar scheme  of liberties for others.” This first principle of justice includes some of the fundamental human rights, like freedom of the person, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, etc. With that, serious infringements of the first principle of justice would be considered an appropriate reason to perform civil disobedience.     

However, this definition is “only within a more or less just democratic state for those citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution.” With that, I wonder if there is any way performing actions like civil disobedience for international issues violating principles of justice would be considered civil disobedience? 

For example, if in one country there is an active genocide taking place, and people in other countries are aware of it, there is a clear awareness of the violation of fundamental human rights. People from these other countries, which are democratic may feel the inclination to help these people and in doing so perform acts like civil disobedience, like sit-ins and other non-violent protests. In doing so, they intend to bring about a change of policy to bring help to these people who are being violated of basic human rights. There is a serious infringement on their first principle of justice, and although it is a different country, and thus a different constitution, people should still fight to end this atrocity. Thus it brings to question Rawls's definition of civil disobedience, if it is possible that it could include nonviolent public acts focused on issues outside of the state as civil disobedience. 

There are also other questions of how other countries should step in when someone in a non-democratic state practices civil disobedience and is subject to the unjust consequence of that unjust state. By practicing civil disobedience, it could be whistleblowing, where this person alerts spread news of the genocide. With that, by supporting these principles of justice through civil disobedience, should countries following, or somewhat following these principles help this person? They may not be obligated to do so, but if we expand the term to include performing civil disobedience for international issues, then it may be right to help those that perform civil disobedience in other countries. Ultimately, these international issues are extremely complex, and it seems the extent to which other countries help is up to them.


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