What are we?

     At the end of section 22, Rawls echoes a concept that he has mentioned previously, which is that he "assumes that the parties in the original position are mutually disinterested" (112). This reminded me a little about a discussion I had in tutorial this week, where we discussed the role of human nature in the original position and whether or not it is even reasonable to assume that humans are innately altruistic or egoistic. 

    I am inclined to share Rawls's conviction that while human nature is to some extent self-interested (which Rawls would describe as mutual disinterest), there are definitely universal elements of our innate mind that a fully rational, self-absorbed individual would not consider to be useful. For instance, the example professor Hurley gave was that while we may have individual projects or goals that we work towards (ending global injustice, saving the whales, ending poverty, etc.), the fact that we are concerned about these things at all mean that there are elements of altruism to our nature. That is, despite the fact that we wouldn't sacrifice time from our own projects to help another's projects, our projects/long-term goals or visions for society itself can and many times do tend towards the altruistic side. This then brings into question the exact nature of our altruism and egoism, and whether this could be quantified? Obviously, this has been a matter of extensive debate that has existed almost since the inception of philosophy itself. I suppose a biologist would argue that given our inherently social nature, the process of evolution has favored characteristics of our mind that make us inclined to be more communal and as such, more threatening to potential predators. However, I wonder if that is all there is to it. If that is the case, wouldn't it make more sense for us all to be completely altruistic and communal? Whatever the reasoning behind the way our minds developed, the fine line between altruism and egoism within our nature is undeniable. I think Rawls's ability to incorporate that within his theory of the original position is a great way of outlining this often intangible and almost indescribable aspect of our nature. 

    Though the question remains, to what extent are we altruistic/egoistic? At what point does mutual disinterest enter the territory of complete self-interest?  

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