A Response to Tim

Tim’s critique of Shelby’s argument appears to have an implicitly consequentialist lens (“logical soundness does not tend to correlate or justify real-life consequences”) (¶1). I argue that this seems to conflate “logical soundness” (¶1) with Shelby’s explicit appeal to the existence of justice and one’s duties of justice and self respect. While Shelby would likely argue that achieving a society with institutions and interactions that reflect a just basic structure would produce beneficial consequences—say in the form of increased life expectancy or higher lifetime earnings—that would not be the primary motivation for doing so. The achievement of social justice would be the primary aim. 

The consequences to which Tim appeals appear to be a “rapid increase in crime rates which…would undermine the social order” and other associated effects (¶3). While there may be other consequences Tim would appeal to, I will mainly consider the effect of undermining or otherwise disrupting the social order which he discusses in his post. To withstand an appeal to the duty of justice, it seems that Tim’s line of argument must either [1] subordinate justice to another value or outcome; [2] deny that substantive injustice exists in, and as a result of, the basic structure; [3] or argue that the duty of justice or the duty of self-respect differs from what Shelby sets forth. I will primarily consider the first option as the other two involve more hypotheticals I don’t want to make on behalf of Tim. 

Even if we fully accept that the consequences of this crime could negate the permissibility of certain crimes, social order seems to be a dangerous candidate. The goal of preserving a social order only makes sense if the underlying social order is just, or perhaps if the consequences of upheaval would be substantially more unjust than the current structure. Shelby makes a strong argument that this is not the case in the United States, so some other consequence must be chosen instead of preserving the social order. 

Considering the example of a counter-reaction by the middle and upper classes that Tim suggests, I argue that this scenario exists today in the Us (but with the classes flipped). Given the lenient institutional responses to the murders of Black people to the disparate arrest rates for nonviolent cannabis crimes despite equivalent use rates across racial lines, isn’t it the case that, especially Black, working class citizens will, “see the government as selectively enforcing laws and choosing not to prosecute crime, which regardless of if it is justified or not, will no doubt lead to violent reactions” (¶3). It seems more likely that this example applies to the residents of the dark ghettos not those in gated communities. 

If we regard the path of leniency for petty crimes to be just, why should the violent reaction of certain groups diminish that? If a majority in a town violently opposed desegregation in schools, would it be just to halt efforts at desegregation? Even if significant groups of people are angry about the application of the law, don’t concerns of morality outweigh those of mere legality? If the law is fundamentally unjust in its content or application, what good is it anyway? Why should violence in support of it or in execution of it make a difference? 

Last, I think the alternative proposal to Shelby embodies the very medical model that they critiqued in the introduction of Dark Ghettos. This approach treats residents of the ghettos as mere ‘patients’ to be cured rather than agents to be respected. It also seems to take the basic structure of society as a given which obscures the extent to which the problems spring from the basic structure itself. If the injustices stem from defects in the basic structure itself, might the overturning of the social order be the explicit goal of oppressed people in pursuit of their twin duties of self-respect and justice.