Anderson and Constitutional Incorporation

 In this blog post, I want to explore a thought I have relating to the implications of Anderson’s account of private government for Constitutional law and incorporation. Cornell law defines incorporation: 

“The incorporation doctrine is a constitutional doctrine through which the first ten amendments of the United States Constitution (known as the Bill of Rights) are made applicable to the states through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

The 14th Amendment intended to guarantee former slaves the full rights of citizenship that the federal government did not previously uphold. It protected them from the private government set up by Southern States and slaveholders.

The due process clause of the 14th Amendment only refers to state governments. It does not apply to private businesses. In the same way that the institution of slavery created a need for the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, an Andersonian should believe that the Industrial Revolution created a need for an amendment restricting businesses from denying their employees their basic freedoms. Further, in the same way that the federal government insures security for the states, they do so for the property rights of businesses. Especially in the case of corporations, which are legally recognized as separate from individuals, it would be just for the government to restrict their negative freedom in exchange for the legal protection forming a corporation offers.


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