Emotional Justice

 I left my tutorial in Tuesday with a clear idea of Smith's purpose of TToMS, however after reading this section, once again have doubts.

Smith makes it very clear that justice is fundamental to society. He writes that Justice is the "main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of society, that fabric with to raise and support seems in this world...must in a moment crumble into atoms" (104). It would seem that the maintenance of justice is not just a worthy goal, but one that should explicitly be a priority in society.

However, he goes to say that we punish crimes against individuals for a reason other than a "regard to the preservation of society" (108). We are concerned for the fortune and happiness of individuals for a reason other than the fortune and happiness of society" (108). This struck me as surprising given this theme of a harmonious society that I thought to be the point of Smith's writings. While he does mention later that there are crimes we punish to enforce this sense of justice and not because we individually feel someone has been wronged, this original admission that some crimes are punished simply because an individual would be "highly enraged and disappointed" if punishment escaped the perpetrator.

If justice is so fundamental to society, shouldn't it be the primary goal. Certainly Smith sees it as a goal which can and should be enforced, but he mentions this individual dissatisfaction first and seems to believe it to not just exist, but even be prioritized over communal justice. 

So, is this Smith simply observing the human behavior that we are emotional beings and fail to wish punishment only because it is necessary for the whole? Can we reconcile this by saying that anything people would be enraged at disappointing at seeing go unpunished is because they individually value the whole, not just because they would be upset?

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