Justice, Society, and the Individual

I wanted to touch on the distinction between efficient and final causes that Smith laid out. But Zac got there first, and I think per explained it in far greater detail than I would've. So, instead, I want to write about Smith's later remarks in Pt. 2, Sec. 2, Ch 3. that discuss the relationship between society and the individual against the backdrop of his discussion of efficient and final causes. 

Later on in chapter 3, Smith continues by discussing punishment within the context of the efficient and final causes. First, however, we should recall the connection between justice and punishment. Justice is a virtue "of which the observance is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, and of which the violation exposes to resentment, and consequently to punishment" (96 - Sec. 2 Ch. I). We should keep in mind here the relation of the feeling of resentment to the virtue of justice, and the necessity of punishment as a response to actions that violate justice. Put more simply, "the violation of justice is injury: it does real and positive hurt to some particular persons, from motives which are naturally disapproved of" (96 - Sec. 2 Ch. I).

While a society can flourish "where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded" (103 - Ch. III), or may even "subsist among different men...from a sense of its utility, without mutual love or affection" (104 - Ch III), the "prevalence of injustice" (104 - Ch. III) will totally obliterate a society. Thus, Smith argues that beneficence (benevolence) is less important to the maintenance of society than justice. 

Smith argues that with respect to punishment the "efficient cause" we seem ascribe to punishment is the preservation of social order. When thinking about punishment, "we frequently have occasion to confirm our natural sense of the propriety and fitness of punishment, by reflecting how necessary it is for preserving the order of society" (107 - Ch. III). But, upon reflection, this seems not to be the "final cause" which we appeal to in laying out punishment from wrongs done, importantly in Smith's view, to individuals. But then where does this "final cause" stem from?

Our concern for society as a collective, in Smith's view, is not this "final cause". In determining whether we are to be more concerned with the individual or the collective, Smith asserts "our regard for the individuals [does not] arise from our regard for the multitude...but our regard for the multitude is compounded and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different individuals of which it is composed" (108 - Ch. III). This means that with respect to punishment, "when a single man is injured...we demand the punishment of the wrong that has been done to him, not so much from a concern for the general interest of society, as much from a concern for that very individual who has been injured" (108 - Ch. III). Importantly, this concern for the wrongs done against an individual does not stem from any particular feelings of benevolence towards that individual, but from our "general fellow feeling which we have with every man merely because he is our fellow creature" (109 - Ch. III). The "final cause" that we seem to pursue with punishment is because injury provokes feelings of resentment in our fellow humans and because of its particular effect on the injured party, not because of its disruptive effects to society as a whole. The fundamental wrongness of an injury against an individual is what should prompt our response to correct that injustice. 

This view of the relationship between justice, society, and the individual is an interesting one. I wonder how Smith's argument would consider claims of systemic injury of a group at the hands of another, or if his framework could conceptualize it properly. For, if we are to be primarily concerned with injustice done to the individual, can there be a class of injuries that is done to a group of individuals? If concern for the social order or the preservation and maintenance of society is an "efficient cause", what are we to make of analyses of defects in the basic structure? It seems as though we might be able to conceptualize injustices in the basic structure as resulting in injuries to individuals, but perhaps we are stretching Smith's concept of 'injury' too far by doing so. Perhaps, injury is alone is insufficient for a comprehensive account of social justice, since it seems like Smith's model will have a harder time recognizing injuries done by systems, structures, or people acting within those.