Liberty vs. Right to Civic Life?

 Brettschneider argues that imprisoned criminals should not be stripped of their citizenship in the sense that they should still have the political right to vote. He bases his argument on the Trop Principle that rebuts against expatriation as a proper type of punishment, with two main reasons: 1) “the Trop Principle justifies prisoners' loss of liberty by ensuring that the punishment is consistent with democratic citizenship” which involves the political right to vote as a way to participate in the civic life; 2) the form of punishment cannot undercut its own rationale, which is that prisoners are subjected to the law because they retain full civic status and thus this status should continue to apply during imprisonment to not contradict the reason why these individuals are punished in the first place.

I generally agree with Brettschneider’s argument in the sense that having the right to vote can give the convicted a sense of entitlement to civic engagement, and encourage their rehabilitation into society. The difficulty to re-enter society will also decrease due to this feeling of entitlement. There might even be a decrease in recidivism rates, again due to this feeling of entitlement during their imprisoned times. But, I am not very convinced by how Brettschneider comes to this conclusion. One of his lines goes: “...the structure of the modern prison must be one that simultaneously allows for the deprivation of liberty as punishment while guaranteeing prisoners’ ongoing right to participate in civic affairs” (144). My question is: How can one’s liberty be deprived without them being simultaneously deprived of their rights to participate in civic affairs? I am assuming Brettschneider means the deprivation of physical mobility and the normal way of living life (earning an income, living with friends or family, etc.) as the definition of “liberty”. However, I would like to borrow Ripstein’s definition of freedom to rebut against Brettschneider’s definition of liberty which is a little narrow in my opinion.

Ripstein defines “freedom” as the state of being independent of the infringement of others’ arbitrary will, where independence is attested by one’s ability to determine what ends one would like to pursue with the means that they have (Force and Freedom, 13-14). This means that we not only can employ our bodily powers to achieve our ends, but we also have no right to infringe on others’ rights to use their means in ways that they determine to further their ends. Thus, no private person can be subjected to the private purposes of others, which protects the fundamental right to individual liberty in Ripstein’s account. Similar to the dilemma of roads that Ripstein presented, it is not the fact that it would be so much harder to travel if all roads are privatized, but it is our entitlement to travel and achieve our ends being deprived by the arbitrary will of others. In prison, when our liberty or our independence is deprived by a system that physically confines them to achieve their ends due to their wrongdoings, how can we say that they are still entitled to participate in civic life as it is also a part of achieving their ends? Maybe the prisoners still have the RIGHT to continue participating in civic life, or they might still be entitled to do so as democratic citizens. But, the confinement of one’s liberty seems to contradict the actualization of such rights. I am not suggesting that we should not imprison criminals at all, which is definitely necessary to protect the individual liberties of others in society. But, I just hope there is more clarification in Brettschneider’s argument that explains how depriving one’s liberty does not interfere with one’s participation in civic life.