More on the justification of ghetto crimes - Scarlett

 I generally agree with former posts on how the justification of crimes committed by the ghetto poor can yield morally questionable court decisions and social consequences. However, I would like to approach the critique of Shelby’s argument in a different manner. Shelby seems to be enlisting two standards for tolerable or even reasonable crimes. One is that “we do not have obligations to unjust institutions, or at least not to institutions that exceed the limits of tolerable injustice” under the general expectation of reciprocity (214). Another one is that in a consumerist capitalist society, citizens have the right to acquire a certain level of quality of life, beyond merely their “constitutional essentials” being secured by the institutions (214 to I don’t remember). I would like to offer some points of theoretical critique on these standards.

1. Shelby is clearly using a “closer to” approach rather than a “better than” one here. As we discussed in the last seminar, there is a dichotomy between a society functioning in a way that is closer to the ideal type or some kind of reality/truth (this is more applicable in science as there are objective truths and facts in science), and a way that is simply better than, which can be more efficient, more socially accepted and so on, other ways. Shelby argues that if we deem our society not closer to the ideal type of justice with the existence of tolerable injustice that we desire, we are no longer obligated by the civic duty to obey its rules. But I would like to argue that this picture of an ideal society is simply too hard to draw, and stubborn attempts to draw it might need more problematic outcomes. There is too big of a conflict of interest here on the notion of ideal society for the basic structures of society to uphold. For example, people who are not the ghetto poor envision a society where no ghetto crimes can present a threat to their safety. As long as this concern is not racially and in any form unreasonably charged, I think it’s a valid concern. On the other hand, the ghetto poor wants a better quality of life, more employment opportunities, and most importantly, de-stigmatization of the ghetto poor. It is a very valid desire as well. But, if a society has its institutions infiltrated with mostly the voice of the predominant groups and the ghetto poor being politically under-represented, the society is more prone to the “better than” solution such as mass incarceration, which would worsen the plight of the ghetto poor. Thus, here, we can see a big problem of taking the “closer to” approach in the first place when trying to justify ghetto crimes. When there is a conflict of interest in defining the ideal just society, it is easy to take up the perspective of the predominant voice in society. At the end of the day, we are not entitled to speak for the ghetto poor that our vision of an ideally just society follows their vision, and thus they should comply even when it seems to provide them with more benefits. However, I am definitely not advocating for a “better than” solution, which can sometimes resort to unjust outcomes such as mass and unreasonable incarceration. I am suggesting a possible outcome of posing the justification of ghetto crimes on pursuing a “closer to” justice society might be troublesome.
   1. A possible solution here might be adapting Brettchneider’s argument that incarcerated people should be able to vote. The ghetto poor having more political voice and representation as a group can not only give them better social benefits but also help with their de-stigmatization process. Allowing them to define what their ideal just society looks like can also help us eliminate our implicit biases influencing our decisions to determine what an ideally just society looks like taking into account the interests of the ghetto poor.
   2. A little more on implicit biases: like I said, we, having this discussion right now, are speaking from a much more privileged standpoint. As there is systematic injustice embedded in our society, we cannot be completely devoid of the implicit biases that underlie our judgments of to what extent should the ghetto poor comply with societal rules. I am also hoping that Shelby can elaborate more on the possible implicit biases we might have, even though we are aware of the ghetto poor’s plight.
2. Shelby might respond to my previous critique by saying that in fact, there is a picture, even though vague, of an ideal society founded upon the notion of “constitutional essentials” and “measures of quality of life”. Or, as long as a society does not present “serious, burdensome, and repeated injustices”, the basic structures of that society are at least not substantially unjust, which gives us a vague picture of what justice in society should look like. But I still think the line of what is just for a society that has so much conflict of interest is simply too hard to draw. Attempting to draw such a line might end up having the predominant groups implanting their biases into the definition of just institutions. I am not negating the importance to pursue justice, but Shelby’s “closer to” approach is kind of concerning to me in the sense that I am not quite sure whether we can ever get “closer to” what we all want, at the end of the day.