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 In “A democratic theory of punishment: The Trop principle,” Brettschneider proposes an extension of the Trop principle to a prisoner’s right to vote and form a prison constituency. This reading made me think about the different perspectives on prison systems and what we intend to use them for. Arguments differ when the foundational principles of what purpose we believe prisons serve differ. Do we consider prisoners as “innocent until proven guilty”? When they have been proven guilty, do we still consider the possibilities of prisoners being falsely punished while in reality being innocent or are we making the assumption that most of the people in these prisons are guilty and deserve the punishments they receive? Even if we view people in prisons as guilty and deserving of punishments, how do we know the punishments they receive (and the punishment of being in prison itself) are equal to the crimes they commit? Is the goal to protect people from prisoners or is it to protect prisoners from the incarceration system? (The answer to this is most likely both, but how do we balance these values? As Frank wrote in his blog post, we should prioritize citizenship over security, but how do we reconcile the consequences of doing so if it ultimately results in higher crime rates?) Would giving prisoners access to phones and the internet encourage them to participate in the political process or would it encourage more crime and escape attempts? 

On a separate note, Brettschneider makes the argument that “if we strip citizenship from those guilty of even the worst crimes, we undercut the very reason why they are democratically obligated to abide by the punishment” (148). I believe this to be one of the strongest points in the reading, but also want to make the argument of looking at it in another way. By stripping people of citizenship, we exile them from why they are obligated to obey in the first place. If a prisoner is declared no longer a citizen, they should hypothetically no longer need to abide by the law since they are not bound by the governance of the state or any social contract. They are then considered free (in terms of no longer expected to follow the law.) Following this logic, they therefore should not be susceptible to punishment. As someone who is not a citizen of any state, no one has the right to punish them. However, does this really matter? Is the reason that prisoners submit themselves to being in prison because they feel democratically obligated to obey or because they are forced to? Regardless of whether a person is a citizen or not, they would be considered a prisoner by the state. Furthermore, people typically would not voluntarily go to prison out of remorse for wrongdoings. How would being democratically obligated to abide by a punishment matter if giving a prisoner citizenship does not make a difference in compelling a prisoner to abide by the law? 

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