Notion of Authority

 Anderson characterizes a government to be a body in which “some have the authority to issue orders to others, backed by sanctions, in one or more domains of life” (42). She elaborated on this notion of government to establish a definition for private government: “private government is a government that has arbitrary, unaccountable power over those it governs”, which she considered the capitalist workplace to be an example of such a private government (45). Anderson also stresses that the Lockean notion in her “Progressive Work Ethics” piece that “when people enter political society, they consent to be governed by such rules as the community or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on” (36). I find it interesting how Anderson emphasizes the notion of “authority” and how people’s entrance into a government rendered the state the “authority” to comply with the rules in a political society. I would like to elaborate on the idea of “authority” in this blog post.

I think in Anderson’s account, an authority is a body that has ordering and sanctioning powers. But more importantly, she thinks that an authority has to diffuse its ordering and sanctioning powers by some form of institutional structure, given her repeated emphasis on the existence of a state. I definitely agree that entities within an institutional structure may create a more substantial impact on the interests of the governed. But, I would also add that the power of social norms and the majority rule may be as powerful as an institution, which makes them qualify as a form of authority as well. Women traditionally had less social and political power than men in this patriarchal society, and this dynamic is often codified into laws, especially in sex offender laws. For example, as we talked about in our philosophy of law class last semester, Lust, as Martha Chamallas argues, is used to justify sexual misconduct. As an inevitable component of human nature, lust can be used to justify both the sex offender’s misconduct AND the plaintiff’s acquiescent consent to sexual assault. However, the court almost implied with this ruling that lust is a drive that males impose, and females receive. This natural association that males are the exercisers of lust on females is the underlying logic that the court interprets sexual misconduct. This is a very illuminating example of how social norms can be translated and codified into laws, which is a crucial institutional structure, and consequentially make a big impact on the governed’s interests. So, given the ability and prevalence of such prejudiced social norms to be transpired to laws, the notion of authority should definitely be expanded to social norms as such.

Furthermore, we shouldn’t neglect the power of the majority. When I am the only one who holds different political opinions in a room of 1000 people, my voice is muffled and inevitably made insignificant. It can be argued that at least I still have the right to speak up about my adverse opinions. But, how is the right to speak up anyhow substantial when it is not being heard? My concern is that what if I entered into political society by birth to which I am considered to give tacit consent but I am the only one with adverse opinions, how do I anyhow have republic freedom? Thus, isn’t the power of the majority another form of authority?

In conclusion, I just want to expand on Anderson’s notion of authority a little bit more beyond state institutions. We are facing different forms of informal and formal authority every day.

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