Plea Deals

 Smith says “the observance of the rules of [justice seem] scarce to deserve any reward” (82). I think it is fair to say this is a generally accepted sentiment. Most people agree that acting in accordance with the rules of justice does not deserve a reward, but this made me think: when do we reward people for acting in accordance with the rules of justice? 

Plea deals are a prominent example of this. One criminal receives a reduced sentence if he pleads guilty and helps the justice department apprehend other criminals. I will consider two types of plea deals in a society with just laws and law enforcement officers. In the first, the criminal receives a deal in exchange for testifying in the case of other criminals. In the second, the criminal goes undercover and helps the police obtain evidence. 

In the first example, it is hard to say that the criminal is doing anything more than observing the rules of justice. The court could have subpoenaed him and brought him into testify without the plea deal. It would be unjust for the criminal to not give up the information at this point as that would hinder justice. Giving him a plea deal in exchange for his testimony just ensures that he will do what he is obligated to do by the principles of justice. Thus, I think it qualifies as an example of a reward for observing the principle of justice and would not be justified by Smith. 

In the second example, the criminal has no legal obligation to work undercover with the police. A court cannot subpoena him to work undercover. He is taking positive action to apprehend other criminals, which I would consider an exertion of beneficence. Smith says, “greater exertions of [beneficence] appear to deserve the highest reward” (81). Therefore, I think Smith would support rewarding this criminal.

Furter, the criminal goes beyond what justice requires him to do and produces good in the second example. It is fair to say that good is produced in the first example, but the criminal is obligated to produce that good by following the principles of justice, which inclines me to believe that Smith should not support rewarding him.

Comments

  1. GraceMarch 31, 2022 at 3:36 AM

    In response to the examples on plea deals, I would point to how Smith emphasizes that beneficence is always free and can not be exerted by force. Although a plea deal appears to be giving a fair choice to the criminal, it is inherently coercive because it is forcing the person into a position where they are gambling for their future. I do not think Smith would consider testifying or working undercover to be acts of beneficence.

    The idea of plea bargaining itself also seems to be at odds with Smith’s views about violating justice. Smith describes how the violator of justice will feel remorse and shame from the sense of the impropriety of past conduct and feel pity for those who suffer by it, as well as “dread and terror of punishment from the consciousness of the justly provoked resentment of all rational creatures.” This means the person who has committed a crime will feel that the resentment they are receiving is just and that they should submit themselves to the punishment they deserve. However, under a plea bargain, a person is negotiating for their own interests in order to minimize the punishment they receive. How does a person reconcile their feelings of self-resentment for their wrongdoing/violation of justice with the natural sympathy for themself and emphasized focus on their own pain/pity in the punishment they will receive? Does their self-sympathy outweigh the concept of justice?

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