Prison Abolition "another one, thank you" for Shelby

In this blogpost, I want to focus on Professor Shelby's discussion/link between prisons, punishment, and condemnation.

According to Prof. Shelby the penal system has two roles: (1) to "provide reasonable assurance to law-abiding members of society that free riding won't be available" (232) and (2) "to deter would-be aggressors before they have a chance to victimize others" (233.) In its first role, punishment enforces reciprocity by making sure that others do not benefit from legal protections while themselves not adhering to the laws that provide these protections. In its second role, punishment is used as a threat to halt transgressions against others before they are administered. 

If these are meant to be the ideal of a penal system, would you say the American penal system (which relies heavily of imprisonment) meets it? I feel that the American prison system in particular does not just play these two ideal roles. Considering the history of especially private prisons as a source of labor (akin to slavery,) it would seem that within the capitalist framework they would serve another role: to maintain the subjugation of Black people (who are disproportionally affected by mass incarceration) for the economic interests of rich white people. So then theres an added interest of these oppressors to use prisons not as an enforcer of reciprocity or a deterrent of aggression but as a tool of oppression. Prisons then become the go-to solution for all our "problems" thus constituting the prison-industrial complex. If we take this to be true and think of your ideas as ideal, would you be in support of movements towards things like prison abolition which seeks to mitigate our reliance on the carceral system? Should prison as punishment become more of a symbol? 

Further, I would like to gauge your position on the role of rehabilitation (which is a major part of the prison abolition movement) in the penal system. Should there be an added role and obligation of the state to rehabilitate imprisoned people back into society? In A democratic theory of punishment: The Trop principle, Corey Brettschneider states "The continuing relationship between the state and the convicted means that the state must respect the statues of the punished as a rights holder and an equal citizen" (142.) Through this Brettschneider argues that a removal of citizenship cannot be a part of punishment in a just democracy. I think you acknowledge a similar sentiment on page 212 of Dark Ghettos  but it seems on a more robust level than Brettschneider. Additionally, you defend a position of public condemnation that is separate from punishment. "I believe the public condemnation of crime can be justified by its symbolic value alone... of course the guilty person's criminal act merits condemnation-- that is, it merits strong public disapproval" (242.)  This is contrast to R. A. Duff who argues that this condemnation should come through punishment and more specifically imprisonment to give imprisoned people a chance to reflect and display apology to the community. While, I think I understanding your aversion to this, isn't any punishment by the state accompanied by condemnation? I think by virtue of how we've been taught to think about the penal system which allows us to condemn anyone that goes through it without ever restoring that person back to equal citizens afterwards. If the state issues you a punishment (I'm talking about more severe ones like large fines and imprisonment), you have been branded, spoiled, and lowered in status in the public eye. By instituting some kind of restorative or rehabilitative process, the state can roll back on their condemnation by acknowledging to the public that you're now suited to participate through reciprocity to the community. 

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