Still Talking Veil of Ignorance here

 If we assume that citizenship is the basis for punishment, then I think it is a sound conclusion that we cannot punish someone by stripping their citizenship. Then, there would be no basis for the punishment in the first place, at least, we would have to find some other reason for punishment. This means that justified punishment strips liberty, but not citizenship. So, even while people are in prison, they have to be able to maintain their citizenship through debates and voting etc. The point I want to look at is on page 144 when Brettschneider writes that in order to maintain citizenship while being punished, "people who have been convicted of crimes must be involved in the discussion of types of crimes to punish and the length for which they are punishable"(144). I want to take a page out of Rawls and argue that some form of the veil of ignorance is useful or necessary here, as it does not seem that those convicted of a crime should be involved in the discussion of their punishment.

    It actually seems that Brettschneider has a similar idea of just punishment to Rawls. On 142 he writes that part of the justification for punishment is found by "asking what those convicted of crimes could agree ti as reasonable punishment for their actions" by viewing "the law in general, not just from their particular circumstance". This strikes me as something very similar to the veil of ignorance, except that it is asking real people simply accomplish what the veil of ignorance does. I see it as unlikely that someone who is convicted of a crime could fairly judge their own punishment due to their specific circumstance. So, I agree that some sort of agreed upon punishment is the best way of finding a just punishment, but it must come prior to the person committing a punishable act. 

    Instead of "convicted criminals must be regarded as citizens, not slaves, exiles or subject of law", I believe convicted criminals should be regarded as citizens who are in fact subjects of the law, just like any citizens. The premise of creating the laws in the first place is that all citizens are subject to them. Of course, in a democratic society, the citizens are also (indirectly) responsible for the creation of the law, but that does not exclude them from being subjects of it. 

    I also found the conclusion drawn from the idea of prioritizing security to citizenship to be an interesting one. All of the steps that lead to the conclusion that we need to maintain citizenship at all costs seemed to me logical, and so it follows that security is secondary. I guess this would mean that anything that comes at the cost of less security, is simply a necessary and even just loss. If prisoners escape etc., then it is a logical side effect of the goals of the punishment system. I actually think this makes perfect sense and degree of errors in security, or a failure of punishment to be fully enacted, are actually necessary and just as they represent the prioritization citizenship over security. Just an interesting conclusion.

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