Why Smith deploys a distinction between efficient and final causes in his argument here, i.e. what the distinction is, and what role it plays in his argument.- Zac

 And if anyone can explain in their blog post, or in class, why Smith deploys a distinction between efficient and final causes in his argument here, i.e. what the distinction is, and what role it plays in his argument.

Challenge accepted.

Smiths main focus in part 2 section 2 chapter 3 is on preservation of society. He begins by establishing how a society bound by love and affection with mutual need and mutual injuries and reciprocal assistance as a sort of ideal society. However, he then argues that a society without mutual love, or a society of merchants may be less happy but would still persist through the merchant's persistent sense of liberty. Even societies of thieves may persist so long as they do not steal for each other. However, Smith argues the largest threat to society that prevents its subsistence is a society in which people hurt and injure at all times. 

Thus Smith establishes Justice as the main pillar of society which ensures its continued subsistence. He then argues an innate element of human nature includes ideals of justice (such as defending the week, punishing wrongdoers etc.) Smith then deploys the distinction between efficient and final cause to establish Justice as formed out of final cause rather then efficiency. 

To build the distinction between efficient from the final cause Smith gives several examples of the "operation of bodies" (pg. 78) such as digestion and watches and argues clearly these objects such as the watch have no intention for efficiency regardless of their creator's (i.e. the watchmaker) desires. The final cause of the watch's hand moving in time is not the watch's desire to be efficient. Smith argues this is obvious in understanding the operation of bodies, but frequently people conflate efficient and final cause in operations of the mind.

For operations of the mind, Smith argues there are frequently the final cause of actions is "natural principles" (pg. 79) which naturally influence humans to "led to advance those ends." (pg. 79) However if those actions are recommendable or fall in line with a rational reason, we retroactively attribute those actions to that reason and dub it efficient, even though we would have and did do it regardless of efficiency. Hence we falsely describe these actions as rational, efficient, and the "wisdom of man," (pg. 79) when in reality the instinctual final cause decision-making is the manifestation of the "wisdom of god." (pg. 79) (since instinct is beyond humans' rationality, nor unique to humans)

Thus the distinction plays an important role in Smith's argument. First it allows him to describe humans natural drive for ideals of justice as being driven by final cause not efficiency. This means humans will be driven to justice even against efficiency. The further implication of this Smith argues for is that humans are thus naturally driven to uphold society, or have a "natural love for society."  (pg. 79) This allows Smith to argue man will not destroy society even if its efficient to do so, because what we dub efficient is determined by final causes arising from natural tendencies retroactively labeled, so efficiency wont tend towards destruction of society. Thus for Smith "Upon every account, therefore, he has an abhorrence at whatever can tend to destroy society." (pg. 79) Finally for Smith this further justifies resenting and acting against those who desire to threaten society. Since loving society is not a rational concern of efficiency, but a natural instinct, there is nothing wrong with instinctually hating those who threaten it. You need no further rational efficiency reasoning to justify hatred, when their hatred of society provokes an instinctual hatred response "But thought it is their intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness, which original inflames us against them, we are unwilling to assign this as the sole reason why we condemn them, or to pretend that it is merely because we ourselves hate and detest them...Yet why should it not; if we hate and detest them because they are the natural and proper objects of hatred and detestation?”(pg.80)



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