Are naturalistic theories really that bad

 Beitz explores four features of natural rights models: 1) natural rights are not dependent on “the moral convictions and positive laws of their society”; 2) natural rights are “pre-institutional in a logical” rather than historical sense; 3) natural rights are possessed by persons “at all times and in all places”; 4) natural rights are “simply in virtue of their humanity” which means it applies to all human beings regardless of their spatial location or social relationships (52-53). Beitz further explains that naturalistic interpretation of human rights presents limitations to the scope and content of human rights, as their contemporary practice can be divergent and go beyond from the understandings of natural rights.

I generally agree with Beitz on his account of why naturalistic theories are limited. His argument presents a sharp contrast with Rawls’ notion of the original position, which is a thought experiment that asks people to suppose no societal affiliations or labels being in place and construct a notion of justice without these social connotations. Beitz rebuts that, for example, the Lockean theory of natural rights entails the protection of personal security and liberty against predictable threats of tyrannical or oppressive government. However, in today’s day and age, the international concern for human rights expand beyond the scope of infringement of political capabilities. Today’s demands for human rights protection extended well beyond the political scope to a package of social conditions that are necessary for the “living of dignified human lives” (57). Without taking into account of today’s situational demands in a timely manner, it would be unreasonable to assume that the prescribed natural rights are sufficient to sustain our international human rights protection system.

Nevertheless, I offer two points of critique against Beitz’s arguments. I wanted to focus on one, but just throwing two out here for the sake of more fruitful discussions.

  1. Beitz’s interpretation of naturalistic theories here are similarly to interpretations of strict originalists in legal theories. Strict originalists want to find out the original legislative intent of our founders when a statute was made, and use that intent as the ruler for judgment in current cases. However, I would argue that though it is unreasonable to assume that our founders could have predicted everything when a statute was made, it is unreasonable for Beitz to assume that naturalistic theories are JUST old and outdated philosophical inquiries among Western philosophers. Locke’s account did specifically appeal to the protection of citizens under a governmental structure and the fundamental rights of citizens in a political society. However, the more fundamental ideal that I think Locke is appealing to is individuals’ entitlement to these capabilities, whether it be economic, political or social. Beitz’s interpretation of naturalistic theories are too normative or literal in the sense that he neglects how these naturalistic theories are based on the people’s entitlement to freedoms in general, not just specific types of freedoms.
  2. How can individuals be truly guaranteed of human rights without the fundamental acknowledgement or guarantee that these human rights are their natural entitlements? Beitz has a really practical account of human rights, which basically describes human rights as a political rhetoric or modern discourse. I agree that human rights discourse does justify and legitimize appropriate human rights interventions. But, without rooting the nature of human rights or the value of having human rights in people’s natural entitlement to them, how can the value of practicing human rights (in Beitz’s account) be substantial? For example, human rights provisions did try to protect gender equality like the UN establishing the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). These enforcement systems are formally in place, like in Beitz’s account, human rights are practiced. However, without substantial ideological change or efforts to change to how society is biased towards women through further judicial enforcement or policy changes and campaigns, how is the human rights practice valuable to change gender inequality? Something to think about.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Development as White Saviorism

Sen’s take on viewing development as freedom seems coherent when the developing body is a part of the community that is being developed. There are troublesome aspects (like the implicit acceptance of unequal distribution of freedoms), but those can be justified and or fixed with minor alterations. However, the account’s flaws become prominent when applied to situations where the developing body is external to the community that is being developed. Because Sen does not factor in the context of when the development occurs and does not outline who can even be a developer, his account would allow for white saviorism.  The issue is not with what Sen’s account includes, but what it does not. Sen’s account does not argue for an equal distribution of freedom. While he believes we should expand freedoms in the most effective way, if this does not expand freedoms equally, it is not clear that Sen would view that as a bad thing. This leaves room for marginalized people in society to be even mor
Read more

I used to be a libertarian and i think Nozick is full of shit

In Anarchy State and Utopia, Nozick argues that patterned principles of justice will require “continuous interference with people’s lives” to continually realize their pattern of distributive justice (162). As an alternative, he argues for an unpatterned principle of distributive justice (PDJ) based on the principle of entitlement. I want to examine some of the key assumptions and concepts he makes in his account in this blog post.  Nozick’s entitlement theory views just modes of interacting with one’s holdings as necessarily leading to a just pattern of distribution. Namely, once justice in acquisition and justice in transfer have been achieved, the resulting distribution is just. As Nozick puts is “whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just” (151). He also touches on “the rectification of injustice in holdings” but goes on to say that the exact nature of that principle is unclear and not discussed by him or others (152). This seems like a bit of a dodge to me.
Read more

The other face of the father of capitalism?

I found reading Smith's theory of Moral Sentiments interesting because a lot of it felt nothing like what he's purported to be according to all the "father of capitalism" stuff. I see how he developed something like the invisible hand because of how he develops his theory: based on observation. He makes empirical claims above human behavior in relation to which actions we approve and disapprove based on how much we can sympathize with the actor. Both this theory and the one about the invisible hand seems to be an explanation about an observed phenomena.  While I think that the method he uses to develop his theories are similar, the ideas present in this piece seems radically different than ideas on capitalism. The ideas that he present in Chapter two remind me a lot of Kantian ethics. The specific passage that reminded me of this was:  "When he views himself in the light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he sees that to them he is but one of the
Read more