Identity and Coherence of Interests

In this blog post, I want to touch upon some of the same themes being discussed by Tim and Zac. For one, I thought Anderson’s discussion of how we become collective agents was a bit dubious. Admittedly, Anderson seems to layout a more compelling framework for conceptualizing rational choice than traditional economics does. An act-consequentialist framework does not seem to be effective in parsing out the motivations for human behavior, nor in revealing what we ought to do. However, it seems to me that she lays out a similarly dubious model for understanding human behavior that relies upon several unspoken assumptions and normatively loaded connections.

It seemed to readily draw a connection between membership in a certain group and the possession of joint interests/preferences and thus the existence of a joint commitment to acting together. I think the link between one’s identity and adopting a joint strategy is not as strong as Anderson’s account seems to suggest. Her account seems to presuppose a homogeneity of interests associated with a given identity. That is, by virtue of identifying with “one another as common members of a social group”, we necessarily have similar aims and can coherently form a joint strategy. This could suggest a stipulation of coherence or homogeneity within a certain group, but that is beyond the scope of this blog post (i.e., it is 4/20). For a quick example to illustrate what I see as a potential pitfall in Anderson’s formulation, one could argue that Americans in the sense of citizens of the nation of the United States are common members of a social group. Even if we are jointly committed to acting together, might we believe in different aims/priorities that we ought to pursue or even different ways in going about achieving the same aim? Might we even have views that are diametrically opposed? Especially if the latter is the case, it seems like Anderson’s formulation has a difficult time addressing this. Is it possible to have a social group in which reasons are not universalizable due to the group’s vast heterogeneity?

I also wanted to respond to the argument about individualism that Zac lays out. The concept of individualism that Zac seems to oppose is one based upon a view that rejects or fails to see “the communities and social structures around their person and does little to change their communally determined social condition” (Zac, ¶3). Additionally, the view of individualism that Zac opposes is one that seems to entail that an agent “[lacks] empathy and solely [pursues] self-interest” (Zac ¶4). That is, Zac seems to view individualism as, to some degree, inherently egoistic and I would argue that is not necessarily the case. This seems to be a particular concept of individualism, and not an especially generous one at that.

In some ways, I argue that a kind of individualism is necessary if we want to change the communally determined social conditions of individuals, and that it need not be solely concerned with self-interest. If we are to achieve real human liberation, and ensure that people are freed from their social conditions, an individualism that sees the fundamental worth and dignity of each person as inherently valuable is necessary. That individualism can be seen as concern for the agency and reciprocal equality of each person independent of their group, communal, or unchosen obligations. Indeed, real human freedom arguably demands that this concern for individuals necessarily supersedes the obligations and status defined by the person’s respective groups and communal ties. After all, someone with a concern for the fundamental primacy of individual agency need not be blind to, say, the familial, religious, or national ties a person holds. Rather, they demand that an individual’s fundamental dignity and status as a free, equal person not be undermined, circumscribed, or reduced by virtue of their other commitments or identities. I argue that this kind of individualism, a concern with the right preceding the good, is a necessary condition of a coherent view of real human emancipation.

Perhaps, Zac has a different interpretation of “real human emancipation”, likely one more a la Marx if I had to hazard a guess. However, if this conceptualization of real human emancipation is opposed to individualism as defined by Zac; would it still be opposed to the form of individualism that I describe? What would this view of real human emancipation prioritize, demand, and discard? I full heartedly agree with Zac that the line between individual and communal commitments and identities is blurry and fraught with challenges. However, I simply argue that there is a valuable concept of individualism that does not encompass the flaws Zac identifies but allows us to achieve some of the conditions necessary for a state of real human emancipation.