aggregation of data

     Deckey discusses Warren and Brandeis's understanding of privacy as it compares to James Madison. Madison essentially sees privacy as contractarian arising from the property we hold "in ourselves" in that it is not violated if you agreed to share the information. However, Warren and Brandeis oppose this notion because modern technology allows violations without the injured party participating (29). They appear to believe something similar to many human rights theorists arguing that people hold a right to privacy "against the world". Deckey views Madison's account as offering a "fuller understanding" of privacy violations (30). 

    The point that I want to focus on here is Deckey and Chris Evan's understanding of privacy "in the aggregate". Evans seems to say that people can legitimately give away their rights to certain very small privacies. The problem arises when that data is aggregated. Anonymization is not even really relevant here, as it is a way to protect privacy, which Evans is claiming is violated anyway. Specifically, people relinquish their right to data, which would be fine, if it was used in ways "they expected when they gave out their data" (31). But, because it is used in "unexpected ways", privacy is violated.

    This certainly stays within the contract argument as it seems to imply that if the person was aware of specifically how their data would be used, then all is fair game, including gerrymandering. Gerrymandering appears to only be a privacy violation because people are not expecting it when they give access to their data. Although, I wonder if people are aware at this point that their data will be aggregated for this purpose.

Secondly, does this mean we somehow have a right for other people near us or connected to us in some way not to share data. If one person shares no data at all, but lives in a town where everyone does, they can still be gerrymandered. 


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