Anonymity is no longer sufficient to secure privacy

 I feel this argument of gerrymandering being a violation of privacy, based on a Madisonian understanding of privacy is very compelling. The point I wanted to explore is Deckey’s argument that citizens retain a right to privacy even when it is anonymized. Kerry and Morris believe that “privacy relates to the protection of one’s identity and property relates to the commodification of an object, or the right to exclude it or share it” (38). Following that, if there is anonymity (name and personal information are protected) data should be allowed to be shared. Since their identity is not involved, this data is now not encroaching on private rights. However, as shown in this paper, through aggregation methods and technological advancements, with anonymity, there is still the ability to predict and coerce this anonymous person, and the population where it lives. Using data of people to coerce them is being used in partisan gerrymandering. In doing so, this is a “violation of their right to privacy as it uses private information on them in order to manipulate the democratic process” (40). 

It seems that the aggregation of enough data can build up enough information about a person, that it practically distinguishes this person without revealing their name, and personal details like phone number, location, etc. It may even give a person a specific code or number to separate them from the others.  As we advance in our technology, we are increasingly finding more and more data about individuals, without revealing their anonymity. However, as time passes, we will reach a point where a name is no longer needed to distinguish individuals. By that, with such vast information that is associated with their names, it will become so detailed, that if you are looking for a specific person in that dataset, you will find them. By that, anonymity defined in regards to your name and personal information will not be sufficient to protect your identity. Thus, it seems that on top of protecting democratic processes by regulating the government’s use of our data, we must also, generally, protect our identity. In that it seems our names are now not the only ways to distinguish ourselves, and we must reevaluate the ways in which we protect our identity across all spectrums.


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