PPECMC2022Sextons

  Reading Nozick was a very interesting exposure to Liberalism. My takeaway from it was that Nozick thinks that the state has no obligation to owe us anything except the ability to secure our ends and means. In his account, he presupposes that everyone has equal capacity to secure their means and protect their ends. His account of property relies on a form of procedural justice that is very similar to what Rawls describes. He has interesting considerations about property and the way property can be allocated and how the market can work to serve our ends.                I think Nozick misses a lot of very important facts about how society works, especially in the way discrimination and prejudice can affect the capacity we have to secure our ends in society. Nozick effectually utilizes and colorblind and classless approach to analyze society. Nozick assumes that people “chose to work” or “chose not to work.” He thinks that this choice is what causes some people to have more material ob

"Isn’t it surprising that redistributionists choose to ignore the man whose pleasures are so easily attainable without extra labor, while adding yet another burden to the poor unfortunate who must work for his pleasures?” (Nozick 170)   After reading certain parts of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, I was surprised by the way Nozick described the redistributionist’s argument. He writes that people are either the men who “choose to work longer to gain an income more than sufficient for his basic needs [because they] prefer some extra goods or services to the leisures and activities [they] could perform during the possible nonworking hours” or the men “who choose not to work the extra time [because they] prefer the leisure activities to the extra goods or services [they] could acquire by working more” (170). From this, Nozick then jumps to how this makes it “illegitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man’s leisure (forced labor) for the purpose of serving the needy.” In doing this,

In Anarchy State and Utopia, Nozick argues that patterned principles of justice will require “continuous interference with people’s lives” to continually realize their pattern of distributive justice (162). As an alternative, he argues for an unpatterned principle of distributive justice (PDJ) based on the principle of entitlement. I want to examine some of the key assumptions and concepts he makes in his account in this blog post.  Nozick’s entitlement theory views just modes of interacting with one’s holdings as necessarily leading to a just pattern of distribution. Namely, once justice in acquisition and justice in transfer have been achieved, the resulting distribution is just. As Nozick puts is “whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just” (151). He also touches on “the rectification of injustice in holdings” but goes on to say that the exact nature of that principle is unclear and not discussed by him or others (152). This seems like a bit of a dodge to me.

Rawls' two principles of justice call for equal liberties and a fair distribution of wealth. The fair distribution calls for the maximization of the fortune of the least fortunate. Rawls does not include property rights as one of the principles of justice. Nozick explains the ways one can acquire property rights: One is entitled to property when they are the original proprietor of it or if the rights to the property are consensually transferred to them from the rightful owner of the property. To Nozick, there are no other ways to obtain property. Taxation that goes beyond paying for protection of rights is not justified as it is a non-consensual transfer of property rights.  This conception of property rights is incompatible with Rawls' second principle of justice. The level of taxation necessary to uphold the principle would exceed the level necessary to protect property rights. Therefore, one who considers property rights to be fundamental must believe that Rawlsian redistrib

 Nozick spends time discussing Amartya Sen's argument regarding individual rights. Sen proposes that individual rights are interpreted as the right to choose between two alternatives. If we add the condition that if some alternative is unanimously agreed upon then it is "ranked higher in the social ordering" (164-5). The important comparison that I want to focus on is the implications of Nozick's rejections. Nozick argues that this understanding of individual rights as linear is contradictory. Say two people make a choice between two sets of alternatives. Nozick points out that this could feasibly lead to a social (or aggregate) order leads to A>C even though one person individually picked C>A. Essentially, this arises because one person likes A more than C more than the other likes C>A.      So, I see the aggregate or social welfare being "maximized" in Sen's argument and am struck by a very utilitarian sounding argument. I do not know Sen'

 The minimal state is no state at all. Nozick begins by stating "The minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified." Implying that a state that goes beyond what is minimally required is unjustified. The obvious defense is to offer one of the many models of a more expansive state, and explain its virtues i.e. at securing distributive justice. Nozick preempts these arguments by arguing against the state's abilities to secure these benefits i.e. a central distributive mechanism ensuring distributive justice. However in the method by which he argues against these orthodox expansive state accounts which privileges the minimizing of the state in all instances as desirable, Nozick leaves his account open to anarchism. Hence, the first sentence, I believe Nozick's ideal minimal state is no state at all. Presumably like Nozick's expansive state dissenters, Nozick would appeal to the necessity of the state on its grounds to secure some virtue, i.e. rectify

 On page 161, Nozick brings up an example of watching Wilt Chamberlain playing basketball as an example against patterned principles of justice. The argument follows that if one million people decide to chip in 25 cents of their ticket money and give it to Wilt to play basketball (D1), Wilt will receive a total distribution of $250,000 (D2). In this case, because D1 is justified, D2 which followed from D1 is also justified. In fact, Nozick goes as far as saying "by what process could such a transfer among two persons give rise to a legitimate claim of distributive justice on a portion of what was transferred, by a third party who had no claim of justice on any holding of the others before the transfer?" (161-162). Nozick then uses this notion to explain that patterned principles of justice (specifically in a socialist society) would consistently interfere with the daily lives of people, as humans are always inclined to ensure their own needs are fulfilled beyond the level of

This blog post is a response to Kara’s post called “The fading American dream.” Like Kara, I was also initially skeptical of Rawls. Kara’s post talks about Rawls’s idea that the inheritance tax serves to maintain background justice by preventing the excessive concentrations of private power. She points out that an analysis of the Forbes 400 list shows that there are wealthy dynasties that accumulate and pass on wealth over generations, and she believes this is proof for Rawls’s claim that measures like an inheritance tax are necessary to maintain background justice. In my blog post, however, I want to contend that examining Rawls’s premises shows that an inheritance tax is not necessary to maintain the justice of background conditions. Rawls’s two principles of justice are first that everyone has equal rights to basic liberties and second that inequalities are arranged such that they benefit the least advantaged members of society and inequalities are attached to positions that are ope

  I was initially skeptical of Rawls's difference principle. However, when I read Rawls’s paper this week, I was more convinced. Rawls’s state “background institutions must work to keep property and wealth evenly enough shared over time so as to preserve the fair value of the political liberties and fair equality of opportunity over generations”(37). Rawls continues by stating “they do this by laws regulating bequest and inheritance of property, and other devices of adjustment, that prevent excessive concentrations of private power” (37).  The United States is known for the “American dream” where America is filled with opportunity and prosperity, and good social mobility for those with hard work. If you put enough time and effort into your work you can move up social classes. However, there has undoubtedly been an increasing divide between the lower and upper class. With that, more of the wealth, and thus power has fallen into the hands of few relative to the population. It seems R

 It seems almost everyone chose to write on Rawls's idea of civil disobedience so I'm not going to redefine it here. In this blog, I wanted to write instead on Rawl's conception of the militant person and the role they play.  The militant person is one who's resistance is violent and is without respect for the law. This person "is much more deeply opposed to the existing political system. He does not accept it as one which is nearly just or reasonable so he believes it departs widely from its professed principles or that it pursues a mistaken conception of justice altogether" (322.) This description reminded me of the moments during the various police brutality protests that occurred in 2020 that lead to violence and looting. These protests where meant to be peaceful which invokes Rawls idea of civil disobedience. Despite this protestors were met with malice and violence by police forces who came fully armored with tear gas and rubber bullets. These protest th

In Section 55, Rawls defines civil disobedience as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” (320). According to Rawls, his theory of civil obedience applies to a nearly just democratic society for “citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution” (319). In this blog post, I want to explore the boundary between violent and nonviolent acts, considering the fact that nonviolent acts have consequences that can be described as violent. Rawls says that his theory of civil disobedience allows for the civilly disobedient act to breach a law that is not the law against which the act protests. For example, if an individual were to protest against a law that imposes a penalty fee on anyone who attempts to enter into a same-sex marriage, he can engage in civil disobedience without entering into a same-sex marriage. Rawls believes this is important becaus

I wanted to explore Rawls’ discussion of the concept of ‘self-respect’ and how it relates to his principles of justice and potentially interfaces with Marx’s concept of alienation. The concept of self-respect seems to be central to Rawls’ account, and an important connection between one’s pursuit and conception of the good and how those manifest in interactions with other individuals equally committed to (and in Rawls’ view entitled to) pursuing their conception of the good.  Rawls posits that people having “a sense of their own worth is necessary if they are to pursue their conception of the good with satisfaction and to take pleasure in its fulfillment” (155). That is, a precondition to even pursuing one’s own conception of the good is to have a certain degree of self-respect. What does Rawls mean by ‘self-respect’? Here, his concept of self-respect means more than a vapid self-help poster. He defines it as “not so much a part of any rational plan of life as the sense that one’s plan

In Section 55 of A Theory of Justice, Rawls defines civil disobedience and designs his theory based on a case of a “nearly just society” that is well-ordered and a legitimately established democratic authority. Civil disobedience is considered “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” (320). If this situation arises even after a society has agreed on his two principles of justice, one question I have is how this nearly just society would allow for an act that violates justice to occur in the first place. Assuming everyone is acting in accordance with his principles, shouldn’t there be general agreement on what constitutes as just/unjust?  Secondly, if violence is not an option and a person has already attempted and failed the normal appeals to make their claim and will not do so again in the future out of expectation of the same outcome, what specifically about Ra

  Rawls’ claim that it is ok for liberties to have unequal worth in a just society is very interesting to me. Rawls states “The inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally, is sometimes counted among the constraints definitive of liberty.” This idea is very similar to what Marx articulated when he talks about how if your property right is an empty right then you do not actually have the right. Rawls, however, qualifies this statement and says “I shall not, however, say this, but rather I shall think of these things as affecting the worth of liberty, the value to individuals of the rights that the first principle defines.” He explicitly admits that “the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. Some have greater authority and wealth, and therefore greater means to achieve their aims. The lesser worth of liberty is, however, compensated for, since the capacity of the less fortunate members of s

  As I was reading through section 55 of Rawls on civil disobedience one thing that I kept thinking of was Poland. However, not about the civil disobedience seen with individuals which happened a myriad of times in the last five years. The women strikes, the protests of law-abiding citizens about the proposed constitutional changes, mine workers, public transport workers, private firms’ owners, and many more have taken the streets of big and small cities in the past few years after a right-wing part Law and Justice gained majority in the legislative and won presidential elections. (Poland is a parliamentary republic.) That was not my main concern but rather what if it is the government that is acting in line of civil disobedience?   Rawls acknowledges that we must have a democratic society and we do have a democratic society in Poland with citizens who “recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution.” I would rather say that is the government that does not acknowledge such pri

 In section 23, Rawls argues that “a conception of right is a set of principles, general in form and universal in application, that is to be publicly recognized as a final court of appeal for ordering the conflicting claims of moral persons” (117). He emphasizes on “generality, universality, publicity, and finality” as conditions of right (115-117). This reminds me of the long and painful final paper I wrote for Professor Hurley last semester in his Philosophy of Law class. I want to discuss how Rawls’ arguments are manifested when our rights are codified in the legal system. In that paper, I looked at how the Equal Protection Clause specified “equal protection” for “all persons born or naturalized in the United States” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV). I argued that there is an extent of linguistic ambiguity embedded in the statute. And thus the court questioned to what extent the enactors of the Amendment intended to protect racial equality: If people were socially separated according to th

When Hong Kong was handed over from Britain to China in 1997, Beijing promised that Hongkongers would popularly elect their Chief Executive by 2007. In 2007, Beijing failed to deliver on their promise, delaying popular election until 2017. In the end, they did not keep their promise. In 2013, a Hong Kong University Law Professor named Benny Tai proposed a civil disobedience plan based on MLK’s example and John Rawls’ Theory of Justice . Essentially, Professor Tai held that Hongkongers met the first two conditions Rawls sets out in Section 57. Their principle of equal liberty had been violated, and they had exhausted their legislative means of redress. For this reason, Tai believed that they needed to resort to civil disobedience.  Since they could not literally violate the bad law, the law keeping them from choosing their candidates, Tai planned an illegal occupation of roads. It was called Occupy Central. Central is a bustling international business hub in Hong Kong. Tai’s plan was to

 A question on my mind this week, especially emerging out of tutorial and some independent discussions with my peers is how Rawls could develop an account of liberalism that severs from the veil of ignorance and original position, such that it can avoid and potentially incorporate elements of a Marxist critique. Perhaps the most promising section where Rawls builds this account is when he offers other main arguments for the two principles of justice in 29.  A first element of note is Rawl's assertion that agreements are only valid if promises are upheld " I shall rely upon the fact that for an agreement to be valid, the parties must be able to honor it under all relevant and foreseeable circumstances." pg. 153. Presumably this means the US and other exams of liberalism are invalid for failing to honor their agreements. From this Rawls argues "They cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences they cannot accept. They will avoid those that they can adhere to

      At the end of section 22, Rawls echoes a concept that he has mentioned previously, which is that he "assumes that the parties in the original position are mutually disinterested" (112). This reminded me a little about a discussion I had in tutorial this week, where we discussed the role of human nature in the original position and whether or not it is even reasonable to assume that humans are innately altruistic or egoistic.       I am inclined to share Rawls's conviction that while human nature is to some extent self-interested (which Rawls would describe as mutual disinterest), there are definitely universal elements of our innate mind that a fully rational, self-absorbed individual would not consider to be useful. For instance, the example professor Hurley gave was that while we may have individual projects or goals that we work towards (ending global injustice, saving the whales, ending poverty, etc.), the fact that we are concerned about these things at all mea

  Rawls focuses on Civil Disobedience and defines it as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of government” (320).  Further it is where “one addresses the sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares that in one's considered opinion the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men are not being respected” (320). These principles of social cooperation are the two principles of justice. The first principle of justice states that there is an equal right to every basic liberty “compatible with a similar scheme  of liberties for others.” This first principle of justice includes some of the fundamental human rights, like freedom of the person, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, etc. With that, serious infringements of the first principle of justice would be considered an appropriate reason to perform civil disobedience.       However, thi

       While discussing the subjective circumstances for justice, Rawls makes a distinction regarding self-interest that I thought a lot about in our tutorial. He notes that even though cooperation is advantageous due to generally similar needs, individuals still have their "own plans of life" (110). These individuals/subjective plans will inevitably lead to conflict. The distinction Rawls make is "although the interests advanced by these plans are not assumed to be interests in the self, they are interests of a self that regards ints conception of the good as worthy of recognition and that advances claims in its behalf as deserving satisfaction" (110). I see a form of self interest as the "not really just" kind in that its ends are the protection of advantages for the self and the other as simply a subjective view of the perception of the good. I think that some way to separate this "interest in self" from a human being would provide a useful hy

  Kuhn’s account of political and scientific revolutions   Widespread sense that existing institutions are inadequate (92) Moves are initiated to change existing institutions in ways these institutions prohibit (93) This results in polarization (93) The polarized camps differ about the institutional matrix for evaluating change (93) They acknowledge no supra-institutional framework for adjudicating the dispute (93) Therefore, political (scientific) recourse fails. Therefore, camps must resort to tools such as mass persuasion and force, and the revolutions that result are “extrapolitical” (extrascientific) events (93-4) Corollary: The victorious camp declares itself to be right/justified/true, and the other to mistaken/unjustified/false (at least in central respects).   It then writes the received history of the process, establish this understanding as the received understanding.   Main Argument Kuhn Considers (and rejects) in Response   The old theory is sti